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would higher fertility rates. 
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1. Introduction 
The dominant inducement for immigration policy today in many industrialized countries is 
population aging — a shift in age structure toward older ages brought about, during the 
second half of the 20th century, by a sequence of high fertility rates followed by declining 
and then persistently low rates (see Bongaarts, 1999, on the history of fertility rates), and 
continuing increases in life expectancy. This is the sequence that has resulted in the pros-
pect of a large proportionate increase in the retired population, a concomitant decrease in 
the labour force proportion, and downward pressure on the level of income per capita. The 
prospect of population aging is widespread among industrialized countries (Anderson and 
Hussey, 2000). The effects will come sooner and be more pronounced for some countries, 
later and less pronounced for others, but the changes in age structure and demographic 
outlook are similar in the main, if not in the details and timing. 
The phenomenon of population aging has been recognized for many years by demo-
graphers, economists, and others and there has been a variety of approaches used to assess 
the possible role of immigration as an instrument to offset its negative effects. Attention 
was given by various authors to population size and age distribution (Bijak, Kupiszewska, 
Kupiszewski et al., 2007, 2008; Loichinger, 2015; Mamolo and Scherbov, 2009; United 
Nations, 2013), the overall level of economic activity and standard of living (Barrell, 
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Fitzgerald and Riley, 2010; Denton and Spencer, 2000; Kahanec and Zimmerman, 2008; 
Lee and Mason, 2011; Masson and Tryon, 1990), the fiscal positions of governments 
(Auerbach and Oreopoulos, 2000; Bonin, Raffelhuschen, Walliser et al., 2000; Dustmann, 
Frattini, Halls et al., 2010; Lee and Miller, 2000; Rowthorn, 2008; Storesletten, 2000), and 
more particularly to the sustainability of publicly-financed pension and health care pro-
grams (Alonso, 2009; Anderson and Hussey, 2000; Scherbov, Sanderson, Mamolo et al., 
2014). Others have been concerned with possible undesirable effects of immigration on the 
incomes and employment of the domestic population (Borjas, 2003; Brücker and Jahn, 
2009; Card, 2009, 2012; Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston, 2005, 2013; Friedberg and Hunt, 
1995; Jean and Jiménez, 2010; Longhi et al., 2005; Okkerse, 2008; Ottaviano and Peri, 
2007; Peri, 2012; Ruhs and Vargas-Silva, 2014) and on the distribution of government 
transfer payments as between immigrants and non-immigrants (Blanchflower and Shad-
forth, 2009; Kerr and Kerr, 2011).  
Much of the economic literature on immigration and aging has been concerned with 
shorter or medium-term effects. Our paper on the other hand is concerned with the longer 
term, in particular the longer-term effects of immigration on a host country’s national in-
come per capita. Immigrants of working age increase the size of the labour force and add 
to the national product. But they and their dependents add also to the overall population, 
viewed as consumers, and thus affect both the numerator and denominator in the per capita 
calculation. Moreover, once in the country, immigrants have dependent children, age, and 
eventually themselves become elderly dependents. The effects on the host country’s aver-
age income level, especially longer-term effects, may not be at all obvious without taking 
into account the demographic dynamics of immigration and its interaction with the host 
country’s population. 
We construct a theoretical model for a country with an aging population and assume an 
infinite supply of potential immigrants. The country, which we call Alpha, is fictitious and 
generic. We model its income generating process in as simple a fashion as possible for our 
purposes, calibrate the model, and use it in a series of simulation experiments in which we 
consider alternative immigration strategies and related issues of productivity, fertility rates, 
mortality reductions, and labour force participation rates of the older population. We use 
actual data as a basis for calibration but emphasize that the model is theoretical; it does not 
represent any actual country but in broad terms shares the demographic characteristics of 
many industrialized countries.     
2. Methods 
2.1 The Setting 
The mythical country of Alpha is our “laboratory”. For simplicity, the population of Alpha 
is divided into five broad age groups, corresponding to intervals of 20 years: Children 
(0–19), Young Adults (20–39), Middle Aged (40–59), Seniors (60–79), and Aged (80–99); 
there are no survivors beyond 99. It is convenient to refer to each age group and each cor-
responding time interval as a generation. All Children are born to the generation of Young 
Adult women; the fertility rate for that group is thus identical to the total fertility rate. La-
bour force participation is confined to the Young Adult, Middle Aged, and (in much lesser 
degree) Senior age groups; Children and the Aged have no participation.  
Time in Alpha is measured in generations indexed by t. The population at t = 0 has an 
important characteristic, a “bulge” in the age distribution inherited from an earlier period 
of very high fertility — a “baby boom”. The “baby boom” occurred roughly two genera-
tions earlier (at t = −2) and was followed by a “baby bust” — a sharp reduction in fertility 
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and a subsequently maintained low level. The Children of the boom are in Middle Age at 
t = 0, and a generation later they will be Seniors. The population is aging. 
Alpha is closed to trade but open to immigration — indeed, there is an infinite supply of 
potential immigrants available, and thus the possibility of using immigration as a tool to 
offset what is going on in the domestic population. (Note that we are talking about immi-
grants as permanent additions to the population, not temporary “guest workers”.) The 
government can set the immigration quota — the number of immigrants to be admitted in 
each generation — and it can set the immigrant age distribution. What follows in this pa-
per is a model and assessment of the longer-run implications of those choices and related 
considerations. 
2.2 The Model 
The dynamics of the population and income generation are simple. Let the column vector 
n stand for the population by age and sex: the first five rows are female age groups 
(youngest to oldest), the second five are male age groups. The progress of the population 
from generation t to generation t+1 can be represented as 
 1 1t t tn Qn m+ += +  (1)  
where m is a vector of immigrants (with age-sex elements corresponding to those of n, all 
nonnegative) and Q is a 10×10 Leslie matrix (Leslie, 1945, 1948); its nonzero elements are 
determined by age-sex-specific survival rates, the fertility rate, and the male/female birth 
ratio. If there were no immigration, and all rates were constant, 1t tn Qn+ =  would hold 
exactly for all t. (The matrix is defined more precisely in the Appendix.) There is no emi-
gration, only immigration. 
The vector m can be separated into two components, one representing the total number 
of immigrants, the scalar M, the other their proportionate age-sex distribution, the vector 
  Aα  , where A is the set of all possible age-sex distributions. We refer to M as the immi-
gration quota. The quota is set as a proportion q of what the total population would be in 
any given generation without immigration. The actual total population in generation t+1 is 
1tu n +′ , where 𝑢 is a column vector of ones, and the total population as it would be if there 
were no immigration is tu Qn′ . The immigration quota is then ( )1t tM q u Qn+ = ′ . Making 
the substitutions, Equation (1) can be rewritten as  
 ( )1 1t t t t tn Qn M Qn q u Qnα α+ + = + ′= +  (2) 
Thus q and 𝛼 are the policy choices for the government. 
The employed labour force — or simply labour force — is determined by the popula-
tion vector n and a vector of constant participation rates r, shared by both immigrants and 
the domestic population: thus 'L r n= .  
Output Z (in real terms) is generated by a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function, with inputs L for labour and K for capital: in log form, 
 ( )1t t tlnZ t lnK lnLµ θ β β= + + + −  (3) 
where θ  is the intergenerational rate of neutral technical progress, or equivalently, total 
factor productivity. Investment I is supported by a constant saving rate γ : thus 
I S Zγ= = . The stock of capital is subject to a rectangular or “one horse shay” deprecia-
tion function (Hulten and Wykoff, 1981). A unit of stock is undepreciated for one genera-
tion, and is then terminated; hence K I Zγ= = , a convenient simplification for our pur-
poses. Note that since a generation is 20 years, the rectangular depreciation function pro-
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vides the same number of capital service years, namely 20, as a geometric function with an 
annual depreciation rate of 5 percent would provide over its infinite lifetime (1/0.05 = 20). 
Substituting Zγ  for K in equation (3) and rearranging terms allows us to rewrite the 
production function in the simpler form  
 t tlnZ gt lnLϕ= + +  (4) 
where ( ) ( )/ 1lnϕ µ β γ β= + −  and ( )/ 1g θ β= − . Output Z is now seen to be propor-
tional to labour input, and hence directly responsive to changes in the population that de-
termine the size of the labour force. The productivity growth rate g is interpreted as a la-
bour productivity growth rate that captures the overall effect of changes in total factor 
productivity.  
In national accounting parlance, Z can be regarded as gross domestic product, or equi-
valently as gross national product, since the economy is closed in all respects except im-
migration. We can define (1 )Y Zγ= −  as net national income (note that capital deprecia-
tion over one generation is Zγ ) or as consumption. But again the choice of a definition 
does not matter for purposes of presentation and analysis: the relevant simulation results 
are shown in index form, and the indexes are identical, whichever definition one chooses. 
We shall refer to the indexes presented in the tables below as national income indexes.    
The simplest practical measure of economic well-being for our purposes is national in-
come per capita, Z/N. Age distribution is ignored in this measure – the denominator is an 
unweighted sum over all age groups. As an experimental alternative we offer also a 
weighted measure in the tables, Z/Nw; children are given half-weight in the calculation of 
Nw in this measure to capture the idea that they consume a smaller share of income than 
adults. Various other measures can be constructed (we have examined several) but the 
overall interpretation of results would be little affected. 
2.3 Some General Considerations 
We calibrate the model in the next section and run a series of simulations in the ones fol-
lowing, resulting in a set of tables that explore the effects of immigration and related is-
sues. First though, there are some general considerations that may be helpful in thinking 
about the interpretation of the model and the simulation results. 
The age distribution of the population is of first-order importance. The problem in 
prospect is the result of a distortion of the distribution brought about by the earlier 
boom/bust sequence of fertility rates, and the consequent imminent decline in the propor-
tion of people of working age. The aim of immigration policy is then to shift the distribu-
tion in a different direction by increasing the proportion of working age and decreasing the 
proportion in the dependency age groups. Obviously that will not be accomplished if the 
distribution of immigrants is the same as the domestic distribution in every generation. So 
the focus will be on bringing in working-age adults. But there is more to the story.   
There are two groups of prime working age: Young Adults and the Middle Aged. (Se-
niors contribute to the labour force also but in only minor degree.) Middle Aged immi-
grants contribute to the labour force for one generation but then move into the (mainly) 
dependent Seniors group in the next, and the Aged group in the one after that. Young 
Adults have the policy advantage of working for two generations before moving on, but 
they also bear children, and thus contribute to both the working population and the depen-
dent population. In fact, children accompanying their parents may themselves represent a 
considerable proportion of the immigration quota. To go a step further, the children of im-
migrants are dependents initially but a generation later they will be in the labour force, and 
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bearing their own children; three generations later they will be of retirement and depen-
dency age, and so it goes. 
There is also the question of how high to set the quota — how many immigrants to ad-
mit in any period. It may be theoretically possible to effect a major shift in population age 
distribution by setting the quota very high but practical constraints are prohibitive. There 
are limits to how many newcomers can be absorbed into the society without disruptive 
effects in any one generation. The question then is how much beneficial effect on the 
economy can be expected from a realistic quota, given the choice of immigration age dis-
tribution. We experiment with alternative combinations of age distribution and quota size.  
2.4 Calibration and Notation 
A characteristic of the Alphan population is that it is the same at generation t = 0 as the 
2001 Canadian census population, and thus exhibits the same distorted age distribution 
and evidence of population aging (Statistics Canada, 2013b). Moreover: the age-sex-spe-
cific survival rates incorporated into the Q matrix are identical to Canadian rates, and can 
be calculated directly from the 2001 Canadian life tables; the initial (total) fertility rate of 
1.6 children per woman is the Canadian rate in 2011; and the ratio of male to female births, 
set at 1.05, is approximately the longstanding Canadian ratio. (We emphasize that the use 
of Canadian demographic data for calibration is simply a matter of convenience. We take 
advantage of the fact that Canada provides a good example of a developed country with a 
“population aging problem”, but we are certainly not attempting to model the Canadian 
economy, population dynamics, or immigration patterns and policy. See the Appendix for 
details and references.) 
The age-sex labour force participation rates — the proportions of (employed) labour 
force in the population, the elements of the vector r — are roughly consistent (in broad 
pattern) with Canadian rates in the decade centered on 2001, with the qualifications that 
the rates for Children are zero and the rates for Young Adults and Middle Aged are equal. 
The rates for females, the top half of 𝑟, are (0, 0.75, 0.75, 0.10, 0); the rates for males, the 
bottom half of r, are (0, 0.85, 0.85, 0.20, 0).  
Since output Z is proportional to labour input, and results are shown only as indexes, 
there is no need to set values for ϕ  or the underlying β, γ, µ and θ parameters (Equation 
(4)). The rate of growth of productivity, g is set to zero in the initial simulations, but al-
lowed to vary in some later ones.   
The simulations involve runs with different immigrant age distributions and some sim-
ple notation is helpful in presenting results. First, note that all simulations assume that 
immigrants in each age group are equally divided between males and females; we do not 
experiment with differences in sex composition. This cuts to five the number of values that 
would have to be reported in defining a distribution. Moreover, we assume in most cases 
(Table 1 is an exception) that immigration policy choices are restricted to Children, Young 
Adults, and the Middle Aged; no Seniors or Aged immigrants are permitted since immi-
grants in those age groups would simply add to the numbers of dependents (aside from a 
small proportion of Seniors who enter the labour force). Our focus is on immigration as a 
policy device for influencing the economy, and offsetting the effects of domestic popula-
tion aging. Permitting older immigrants to enter might be considered desirable for other 
reasons but its effect on immigration as an economic policy tool would be to weaken it. A 
practical result of this exclusion for presentation purposes is that the number needed to be 
reported in defining an immigration age distribution is now reduced to three. We choose 
the symbol AGEIM to stand for “age distribution of immigrants” and report the propor-
tions in percentage form. AGEIM (25, 50, 25), for example, means that immigrants are 
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distributed as 25 percent Children, 50 percent Young Adults, and 25 percent Middle Aged. 
3. Results 
3.1 Initial Simulations 
We begin, in Table 1, with some simulations that exclude or include immigration. The 
starting population (t = 0) is shown in the first column of figures. The next three show the 
evolution of the population over three generations, assuming no immigration. The final 
three introduce immigration and trace the evolution again, assuming three alternative im-
migration quotas, each coupled with an age distribution identical to that of the initial (t = 0) 
population. 
When there is no immigration the population increases by 4.5 percent in the first gener-
ation and decreases thereafter; in fact, with the fertility rate constant at 1.6 children per 
woman the population would decline from generation to generation indefinitely. (The 
  
 
Table 1. Simulations with and without immigration; immigrants distributed by age as in the initial population 
 No immigration AGEIM like initial population 
 t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 
     --------------------- q = 10% --------------------- 
Population 100.0 104.5 98.0 87.1 114.9 119.8 119.7 
- growth rate — 4.5 –6.2 –11.1 14.9 4.3 –0.1 
- proportion old 16.8 26.6 31.5 31.9 25.7 29.7 30.0 
- proportion child 25.7 21.9 20.2 20.3 22.3 20.9 21.0 
LF/Pop. ratio 48.1 44.5 42.2 41.7 44.8 43.0 42.6 
National income 100.0 96.8 86.1 75.6 107.2 107.1 106.0 
- per capita 100.0 92.6 87.9 86.8 93.3 89.4 88.6 
- wtd. per capita 100.0 90.7 85.2 84.2 91.5 87.0 86.2 
     --------------------- q = 20% --------------------- 
Population 100.0 104.5 98.0 87.1 125.4 143.8 159.3 
- growth rate — 4.5 –6.2 –11.1 25.4 14.7 10.8 
- proportion old 16.8 26.6 31.5 31.9 25.0 28.3 28.5 
- proportion child 25.7 21.9 20.2 20.3 22.5 21.4 21.5 
LF/Pop. ratio 48.1 44.5 42.2 41.7 45.1 43.5 43.2 
National income 100.0 96.8 86.1 75.6 117.7 130.3 143.4 
- per capita 100.0 92.6 87.9 86.8 93.9 90.6 90.0 
- wtd. per capita 100.0 90.7 85.2 84.2 92.2 88.4 87.9 
     --------------------- q = 30% --------------------- 
Population 100.0 104.5 98.0 87.1 135.8 170.0 206.8 
- growth rate — 4.5 –6.2 –11.1 35.8 25.2 21.6 
- proportion old 16.8 26.6 31.5 31.9 24.3 27.1 27.3 
- proportion child 25.7 21.9 20.2 20.3 22.8 21.8 21.9 
LF/Pop. ratio 48.1 44.5 42.2 41.7 45.4 44.0 43.8 
National income 100.0 96.8 86.1 75.6 128.1 155.7 188.3 
- per capita 100.0 92.6 87.9 86.8 94.4 91.5 91.1 
- wtd. per capita 100.0 90.7 85.2 84.2 92.8 89.5 89.1 
Note: Population and income variables are indexes; all other variables are percentages. Proportion old is percentage of Seniors and Aged combined; wtd. per 
capita income assigns half weights to children. The initial population age distribution is (25.7, 29.2, 28.3, 13.8, 3.0). 
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natural replacement rate is approximately 2.07; we experiment with different rates in later 
simulations.) The proportion of old people (Seniors plus Aged) increases from 16.8 per-
cent at t = 0 to 26.6 percent at t = 1, and then almost doubles the initial level, rising to 31.5 
and 31.9 percent. Concomitantly, the proportion of Children decreases. The ratio of labour 
force to population falls from 48.1 percent at t = 0 to 44.5 percent at t = 1, and then to 42.2 
and 41.7 percent, producing sharp declines in the national income index: from a base of 
100.0 at t = 0, income falls to 96.8 at t = 1, 86.1 at t = 2, and 75.6 at t = 3. Income per ca-
pita falls accordingly, but less precipitously after one generation, since the population is 
also declining: the unweighted measure falls to 92.6, 87.9, and 86.8; the weighted measure 
falls even more — to 90.7, 85.2, and 84.2. Such is the population/economy trajectory in 
the absence of immigration. We have run the simulations out for several more generations 
beyond the three for which results are shown in the table but the longer-run pattern is clear 
after three: a continuing high proportion of old people relative to the base generation, a 
continuing lower proportion of children, a much reduced labour force-to-population ratio, 
a declining national income, and a much lower level of income per capita, weighted or 
unweighted.  
Immigration is introduced in Table 1 (and in subsequent tables) at three quota levels: 10, 
20, and 30 percent per generation. (The corresponding annual rates are approximately 0.48, 
0.92, and 1.32 percent; a sustained level of .48 would be considered rather high by modern 
international standards for an industrialized country, and 1.32 as very high.) As noted 
above, the age distribution chosen for this first set of simulations with immigration is the 
distribution of the population as it was at t = 0; it is chosen simply as a reference case. One 
effect is to stop the decline of the population (with the exception of a very slight dip when 
q = 10 percent, at t = 3). The proportion of old people is a little lower than in the 
no-immigration case and the labour force/population ratio a little higher, although it takes 
a very high quota rate to have much effect in that regard. The immediate decline of nation-
al income is arrested: with q = 10 percent income roughly levels off; it increases signifi-
cantly with q = 20 percent and rapidly with q = 30 percent. But income per capita (either 
measure) never recovers; it is higher than the corresponding no-immigration level in all 
cases but still well below what is was at t = 0. In short, bringing in immigrants with the 
base level age distribution can moderate the income decline induced by population aging, 
but only in limited degree if one takes account of the effect of immigration on the size of 
the population as well as the level of economic activity, and then only with a high quota 
level.     
3.2 Immigration with Working-age Concentration 
Choosing an age distribution with a high concentration of immigrants in the working ages 
— Young Adults and Middle Aged — makes a big difference. Table 2 assumes two such 
distributions: (a) 50 percent Young Adults, 25 percent Middle Aged, plus 25 percent 
Children; (b) 75 percent Young Adults, no Middle Aged, plus 25 percent Children. Both 
distributions raise the labour force/population ratio and increase the level of national in-
come per capita (either measure) above what it would have been had there been no immi-
gration, and also above the level resulting from the immigrant age distribution assumed in 
Table 1. The effects are greater, the higher the quota. The immediate effect (t = 1) is the 
same for both distributions but by the second generation (t = 2) the Middle Aged immi-
grants admitted previously under distribution (a) have become Seniors, and thus started to 
add to the dependent population. Under distribution (b) this effect is delayed until the third 
generation (t = 3).  
A fraction of the decline in income per capita from the base period is offset under either 
distribution. The quota matters greatly in this regard but whatever the quota, the distribution  
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Table 2. Simulations with alternative immigrant age distributions when there are child immigrants 
 AGEIM (25, 50, 25) AGEIM (25, 75, 0) 
 t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 
 --------------------------------------------------------------- q = 10% --------------------------------------------------------------- 
Population 100.0 114.9 123.2 127.1 114.9 125.9 134.3 
- growth rate — 14.9 7.2 3.2 14.9 9.5 6.7 
- proportion old 16.8 24.2 26.8 27.5 24.2 24.5 25.4 
- proportion child 25.7 22.2 21.7 21.3 22.2 22.9 22.0 
LF/Pop. ratio 48.1 45.9 44.3 44.1 45.9 44.8 45.0 
National income 100.0 109.8 113.5 116.7 109.8 117.3 125.7 
- per capita 100.0 95.5 92.1 91.8 95.5 93.2 93.7 
- wtd. per capita 100.0 93.7 90.1 89.5 93.7 91.8 91.7 
 --------------------------------------------------------------- q = 20% --------------------------------------------------------------- 
Population 100.0 125.4 151.1 177.4 125.4 157.0 194.6 
- growth rate — 25.4 20.5 17.4 25.4 25.2 24.0 
- proportion old 16.8 22.2 23.3 24.1 22.2 19.6 20.7 
- proportion child 25.7 22.4 22.8 22.1 22.4 24.7 23.4 
LF/Pop. ratio 48.1 47.1 45.9 45.9 47.1 46.7 47.2 
National income 100.0 122.8 144.3 169.4 122.8 152.6 191.2 
- per capita 100.0 98.0 95.5 95.5 98.0 97.2 98.3 
- wtd. per capita 100.0 96.2 93.9 93.6 96.2 96.7 97.0 
 --------------------------------------------------------------- q = 30% --------------------------------------------------------------- 
Population 100.0 135.8 181.8 238.9 135.8 191.3 269.7 
- growth rate — 35.8 33.9 31.4 35.8 40.9 40.9 
- proportion old 16.8 20.5 20.5 21.4 20.5 16.1 17.3 
- proportion child 25.7 22.6 23.5 22.7 22.6 25.9 24.4 
LF/Pop. ratio 48.1 48.1 47.2 47.3 48.1 48.2 48.8 
National income 100.0 135.9 178.7 235.1 135.9 192.1 274.0 
- per capita 100.0 100.1 98.3 98.4 100.1 100.4 101.6 
- wtd. per capita 100.0 98.3 97.0 96.8 98.3 100.5 100.8 
Note: See relevant parts of note to Table 1. 
 
with the higher proportion of Young Adults dominates. However, even that one requires a 
high quota to eliminate the decline from the initial level; to come close requires a quota of 
20 percent, to eliminate the decline entirely requires a quota of 30 percent, and even then 
the result is not achieved until the second generation.    
3.3 The Effect of Eliminating Child Immigrants 
Child immigrants augment immediately the dependent component of the population and it 
is of interest therefore to explore the consequences of restricting admission to adults. The 
two immigration choices in Table 3 repeat the distributions of adult immigrants in Table 2 
but now stipulate no Child immigrants; the quotas remain the same but the immigration 
totals consist entirely of adults. The effects are immediate and significant. The income per 
capita indexes are higher than they were with Children included, in all cases, and the de-
cline from base level is eliminated, all but eliminated, or even converted to an increase 
with quotas of 20 and 30 percent coupled with the most highly concentrated of the two 
adult age distributions. Exact results depend on whether one uses the weighted or 
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Table 3. Simulations with alternative immigrant age distributions when there are no child immigrants 
 AGEIM (0, 67, 33) AGEIM (0, 100, 0) 
 t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 
 --------------------------------------------------------------- q = 10% --------------------------------------------------------------- 
Population 100.0 114.9 124.5 127.1 114.9 128.1 136.6 
- growth rate — 14.9 8.4 2.1 14.9 11.5 6.7 
- proportion old 16.8 24.2 27.1 29.4 24.2 24.1 26.5 
- proportion child 25.7 19.9 20.4 18.6 19.9 21.9 19.7 
LF/Pop. ratio 48.1 47.7 45.2 45.0 47.7 45.9 46.2 
National income 100.0 114.1 117.1 118.9 114.1 122.3 131.3 
- per capita 100.0 99.3 94.1 93.5 99.3 95.5 96.1 
- wtd. per capita 100.0 96.1 91.3 89.9 96.1 93.5 92.9 
 --------------------------------------------------------------- q = 20% --------------------------------------------------------------- 
Population 100.0 125.4 154.1 178.1 125.4 161.8 201.4 
- growth rate — 25.4 22.9 15.6 25.4 29.1 24.4 
- proportion old 16.8 22.2 23.7 26.8 22.2 19.1 22.1 
- proportion child 25.7 18.3 20.1 17.6 18.3 22.5 19.4 
LF/Pop. ratio 48.1 50.4 47.8 47.7 50.4 48.9 49.5 
National income 100.0 131.5 153.2 176.7 131.5 164.7 207.5 
- per capita 100.0 104.9 99.4 99.2 104.9 101.8 103.0 
- wtd. per capita 100.0 100.6 96.3 94.8 100.6 99.9 99.4 
 --------------------------------------------------------------- q = 30% --------------------------------------------------------------- 
Population 100.0 135.8 186.6 241.5 135.8 199.3 283.3 
- growth rate — 35.8 37.4 29.4 35.8 46.7 42.2 
-proportion old 16.8 20.5 21.1 24.5 20.5 15.5 18.7 
- proportion child 25.7 16.9 19.5 16.8 16.9 22.4 19.1 
LF/Pop. ratio 48.1 52.7 50.0 50.0 52.7 51.4 52.1 
National income 100.0 148.9 194.3 251.2 148.9 213.2 307.3 
- per capita 100.0 1O9.7 104.1 104.0 109.7 107.0 108.5 
- wtd. per capita 100.0 104.4 100.5 99.0 104.4 105.0 104.6 
Note: See relevant parts of note to Table 1. 
 
unweighted per capita measure for comparison but the general nature of the effects is clear: 
excluding Child immigrants raises per capita national income above what it would other-
wise have been, both immediately and in subsequent generations.   
3.4 The Implications of Quota/age Distribution Choices: A Closer Look    
The choice of a quota establishes the total number of immigrants in any generation as a 
proportion of the population, calculated as it would be if there were no immigrants. We 
experiment with three quotas, 10, 20, and 30 percent. Policy makers would have to judge 
whether these quotas were acceptable in relation to the overall size of the population or 
whether they would pose difficulties in absorbing the resulting numbers of new immi-
grants into the society. But the choice of an age distribution takes the absorption issue fur-
ther; it invites the question of whether the implied number of immigrants in each age 
group is acceptable. We consider now, from that point of view, the number of immigrants 
as a proportion of the population in each group. We do this for generation 1 and show the 
results in Table 4. 
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Referring back to Section 2.2, the total population in generation 1 can be obtained from 
Equation (2) as 
 ( )1 1 0 0' 'N u n u n q u Qn= = + ′  (5) 
where u is again a vector of ones. Let b1 be the vector of age-sex proportions of the overall 
population in generation 1 (corresponding to α , the age-sex proportions vector for immi-
grants). We may then write 
 ( )( )1 1 1 0 0 1n N b u Qn q u Qn b′+′= =  (6) 
The immigration total is ( )1 0M q u Qn α′= . Letting ( )diag α  and 1( )diag b  be diagon-
al matrices in which α  and b1 are the diagonals, we write  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1




( / 1 ) ( )
H q u Qn diag u Qn q u Qn diag b







The age-sex-specific immigrant proportions are the diagonal elements of H and the overall 
share proportion is ( )1 1/ / 1M N q q= + . Age-specific (male plus female) share propor-
tions based on Equation (7) are shown in Table 4 for the three immigration quotas and the 
alternative age distributions used in the earlier tables. 
Age distributions with concentrations in the working age groups can increase markedly 
the level of national income per capita, as shown in Tables 2 and 3. But a concomitant of 
that is a high proportion of immigrants in those particular groups and possible difficulties  
 
Table 4. Immigrants in generation 1 as percentage of population, by age group, based on alternative choices of immigration quota and age 
distribution 
Immigration age distribution (AGEIM) 
 Like initial pop. (25, 50, 25) (25, 75, 0) (0, 67, 33) (0, 100, 0) 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------q = 10% ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Children 10.5 10.2 10.2 0.0 0.0 
Young Adults 10.7 17.0 23.5 21.6 29.1 
Middle Aged 9.5 8.4 0.0 10.9 0.0 
Seniors 5.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Aged 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
All ages 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- q = 20% ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Children 19.0 18.6 18.6 0.0 0.0 
Young Adults 19.3 29.1 38.1 35.4 45.0 
Middle Aged 17.3 15.5 0.0 19.6 0.0 
Seniors 11.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Aged 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
All ages 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- q = 30% ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Children 26.0 25.5 25.5 0.0 0.0 
Young Adults 26.4 38.1 47.9 45.2 55.2 
Middle Aged 23.8 21.7 0.0 26.7 0.0 
Seniors 15.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Aged 17.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
All ages 23.1 23.1 23.1 23.1 23.1 
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of absorbing the implied large numbers of newcomers of a given age into the society. The 
issue of absorption lies outside our model framework but it is something that the govern-
ment would have to consider. The extreme situations in both national income benefits and 
possible absorption difficulties occur when only Young Adult immigrants are admitted to 
the country — the distribution (0, 100, 0). With a quota of 10 percent, 29 percent of the 
population in that age group are immigrants; with a 20 percent quota, 45 percent are im-
migrants; and with a 30 percent quota the proportion is well over half, 55 percent. Even 
with the somewhat less concentrated (0, 67, 33) distribution the proportion in the Young 
Adult age group reaches 35 percent with a 20 percent quota and 45 percent with a quota of 
30 percent. The policy choice that the government must make poses a tradeoff — accept-
ing a lower level of income per capita than what might be attainable through immigration 
vs. possible societal absorption difficulties with a higher immigration quota. 
3.5 Productivity Growth as an Offset to Population Aging 
The rate of growth of productivity is denoted by g in Equation (4), Section 2.2. We have 
set g to zero in all of the simulations thus far. Now we experiment with positive values. 
The immigration quota and age distribution are under government control; the rate of 
productivity growth is not. The government may be able to nudge the rate a little by this or 
that policy but the extent of its influence is no doubt limited. Nevertheless, it is of interest 
to see how productivity growth might act as an offset to the negative effect of population 
aging on the economy.   
Table 5 shows what would happen to national income per capita (unweighted) if a 
productivity growth rate of 5 or 10 percent were coupled with an immigration quota of 0, 
10, 20, or 30 percent, using the (25, 50, 25) age distribution for the calculations in these 
experiments. (A productivity growth rate of 5 percent per generation is equivalent to an 
annual rate of only 0.24 percent; a growth rate of 10 percent per generation is equivalent to 
an annual rate of 0.48 percent.) 
The results in Table 5 appear striking: productivity growth of 10 percent per generation 
 
Table 5. Simulations of national income per capita assuming alternative rates of productivity growth (g), with and without immigration (q) 
 t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 
q = 0 (no immigration) 
g = 0 100.0 92.6 87.9 86.8 
g = 5% 100.0 97.2 96.9 100.5 
g = 10% 100.0 101.9 106.3 115.5 
q = 10% 
g = 0 100.0 95.5 92.1 91.8 
g = 5% 100.0 100.3 101.6 106.2 
g = 10% 100.0 105.1 111.5 122.1 
q = 20% 
g = 0 100.0 98.0 95.5 95.5 
g = 5% 100.0 102.9 105.3 110.5 
g = 10% 100.0 107.8 115.6 127.1 
q = 30% 
g = 0 100.0 100.1 98.3 98.4 
g = 5% 100.0 105.1 108.3 113.9 
g = 10% 100.0 110.1 118.9 131.0 
Note: AGEIM is (25, 50, 25) in all cases where there is immigration. 
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by itself, with no immigration, would wipe out immediately (t = 1) the decline of national 
income per capita brought about by population aging, and raise the income per capita level 
further in subsequent generations. Coupling even a 5 percent growth rate with positive 
immigration quotas would set an upward trajectory for income per capita. It would seem 
then that even a modest rate of productivity growth would eliminate all concerns about the 
economic effects of population aging. However, that interpretation is superficial.   
Suppose, to make a point, that while the productivity growth rate in Alpha is 5 percent, 
the growth rate in the rest of the world is 10 percent. Relative to other countries Alpha’s 
national income per capita would then fall by about 4.5 percent in the first generation (on 
top of whatever was the decline resulting from population aging), by 8.9 percent in the 
second, and so on. The point is that to be interpreted realistically, the productivity growth 
rate should be defined as the difference from the growth rate in the rest of the world. 
Moreover, if the economy were open rather than closed it would find its terms of trade 
deteriorating and its relative standard of living falling as a result of its slower productivity 
growth. If 𝑔 is defined as a differential rate of productivity growth, a positive rate would 
indeed offset some or all of the effects of population aging on the economy. Zero produc-
tivity growth, as we have assumed in the earlier simulations, would then imply that prod-
uctivity was growing in Alpha at the same rate as elsewhere and that income was meas-
ured correspondingly, in relative terms.   
3.6 What if the Fertility Rate were to Increase? 
The “natural replacement” fertility rate is a little under 2.1 children per woman. That is the 
rate required for the population to achieve a stationary state in the long run — constant 
population size and an unchanging age distribution. A higher rate would result in conti-
nuous population increase, a lower rate in continuous population decline. What if the rate 
were to increase from the 1.6 level assumed up to now?  
Letting F stand for fertility rate, we experiment with two higher levels, starting at t = 1: 
the levels are F = 2.0745 (the natural replacement rate to four decimal places) and F = 2.5, 
a value well above replacement. Would such higher rates add to or diminish the effects of 
population aging on the economy?  
The results of the experiments are presented in Table 6. To isolate fertility effects we 
assume no immigration. The top panel of the table repeats the no-immigration results from 
Table 1, with the fertility rate held at 1.6. The middle and bottom panels show results for 
the two higher rates.   
With F equal to the replacement rate, the population increases more rapidly at t = 1, and 
remains at the higher level thereafter, thus arresting the long-run population decline ob-
served previously. But a higher value of F means more children in the first generation, 
more dependents in the population, a lower labour force/population ratio, and a lower level 
of national income per capita. The unweighted per capita income index has dropped sig-
nificantly, from 92.6 (when the fertility rate was 1.6) to 87.0 with the new higher rate; the 
weighted index has dropped somewhat less, from 90.7 to 87.5. In the second generation 
(t = 2) the children of the first have come of working age but a new cohort of child depen-
dents has taken their place, and there are only small changes in the labour force/population 
ratio and per capita income indexes. There are some further differences in generation 3 but 
overall the picture is generally similar to that of generation 2. 
Much the same can be said, qualitatively, for the results of the further increase in fertility 
rate to 2.5. What were smaller effects with replacement fertility though have now become 
bigger ones. Most notably, the reduction of per capita income (weighted or unweighted) in 
the first generation is much greater. 
In sum, the effect on the economy of an increase in the fertility rate in the first generation 
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Table 6. Simulations assuming alternative fertility rates (F) with no immigration 
 t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 
 --------------------------------------------------------------- F = 1.6 --------------------------------------------------------------- 
Population 100.0 104.5 98.0 87.1 
- growth rate — 4.5 -6.2 -11.1 
- proportion old 16.8 26.6 31.5 31.9 
- proportion child 25.7 21.9 20.2 20.3 
LF/Pop. Ratio 48.1 44.5 42.2 41.7 
National income 100.0 96.8 86.1 75.6 
- per capita 100.0 92.6 87.9 86.8 
- wtd. per capita 100.0 90.7 85.2 84.2 
 ------------------------------------------------------------ F = 2.0745 ------------------------------------------------------------ 
Population 100.0 111.3 110.6 111.4 
- growth rate — 11.3 -0.6 0.8 
- proportion old 16.8 25.0 27.9 25.0 
- proportion child 25.7 26.7 23.2 26.6 
LF/Pop. ratio 48.1 41.8 42.3 41.5 
National income 100.0 96.8 97.3 96.1 
- per capita 100.0 87.0 88.0 86.3 
- wtd. per capita 100.0 87.5 86.7 86.7 
 --------------------------------------------------------------- F = 2.5 --------------------------------------------------------------- 
Population 100.0 117.3 121.9 135.9 
- growth rate — 17.3 3.9 11.5 
- proportion old 16.8 23.7 25.3 20.5 
- proportion child 25.7 30.5 25.4 31.7 
LF/Pop. ratio 48.1 39.6 42.3 40.5 
National income 100.0 96.8 107.4 114.6 
- per capita 100.0 82.4 88.1 84.3 
- wtd. per capita 100.0 84.8 87.9 87.3 
Note: See relevant parts of note to Table 1. F = 2.0745 is the natural replacement rate. 
 
can be large and unfavourable, from the point of view of income per capita, owing to the 
addition of more child dependents. The effects in the subsequent generations, when the 
earlier-generation children have entered the labour force, are smaller, and somewhat mixed.  
3.7 Effects of Reduced Mortality and Increased Participation of Seniors 
The simulations to this point have assumed constant mortality and labour force participa-
tion rates. We experiment now with declining mortality rates, considered alone and in 
combination with increased participation of seniors, both with and without concurrent im-
migration. The mortality assumption is that age-sex death rates would decline over the 
next three generations at the same average proportionate rates of change as in the last three. 
(These rates of change are the Canadian life table rates calculated over the 60-year period 
1941–2001; see Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1947, and Statistics Canada, 2006, for the 
life tables used in the calculations.) The participation assumption is that participation rates 
of Seniors would increase by half in the first generation, and stay at the new levels in the 
subsequent two; that means that the participation rate for males would increase from 20 
percent to 30 percent, the rate for females from 10 percent to 15 percent. The assumptions 
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about accompanying immigration are a 20 percent quota and a (25, 50, 25) age distribution. 
The results of the experiments are presented in Table 7. The top panel in the table repeats 
results from Tables 1 and 2: constant mortality rates are assumed, with and without immi-
gration. The middle panel assumes declining mortality and the bottom one declining mor-
tality plus increased participation rates, with and without immigration in both cases.    
The most prominent effect of declining mortality, taken alone, is to increase the propor-
tion of older dependents in the population, decrease the labour force/population ratio, and 
lower both measures of income per capita. Immigration operates in the opposite direction, 
and much more strongly. Introducing increased participation of seniors in the bottom panel 
of the table offsets the increased dependency effect of lower death rates and has a net posi-
tive effect on income per capita, but immigration is again the dominant contributor. In 
short, declining mortality lowers per capita income, declining mortality plus increasing 
Seniors’ participation rates by half raises it, but while the net effect is significant it takes 
second place to the effect of immigration. 
 
Table 7. Simulations with and without immigration, allowing for declining mortality rates and increased labour force participation of Seniors 
 No immigration Immigration, q = 20% 
 t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 
 --------------------------------------------------------------- constant mortality --------------------------------------------------------------- 
Population 100.0 104.5 98.0 87.1 125.4 151.1 177.4 
- growth rate — 4.5 –6.2 –11.1 25.4 20.5 17.4 
- proportion old 16.8 26.6 31.5 31.9 22.2 23.3 24.1 
- proportion child 25.7 21.9 20.2 20.3 22.4 22.8 22.1 
LF/Pop. ratio 48.1 44.5 42.2 41.7 47.1 45.9 45.9 
National income 100.0 96.8 86.1 75.6 122.8 144.3 169.4 
- per capita 100.0 92.6 87.9 86.8 98.0 95.5 95.5 
- wtd. per capita 100.0 90.7 85.2 84.2 96.2 93.9 93.6 
 --------------------------------------------------------------- declining mortality --------------------------------------------------------------- 
Population 100.0 106.5 103.3 94.7 127.8 158.8 192.6 
- growth rate — 6.5 –3.0 –8.4 27.8 24.2 21.3 
- proportion old 16.8 27.6 34.3 36.3 23.0 25.3 27.0 
- proportion child 25.7 21.5 19.3 18.8 22.1 22.0 21.1 
LF/Pop. ratio 48.1 44.1 40.9 39.5 46.7 45.0 44.5 
National income 100.0 97.7 87.8 77.8 124.3 148.6 178.3 
- per capita 100.0 91.7 85.0 82.2 97.2 93.6 92.6 
- wtd. per capita 100.0 89.6 82.0 79.1 95.3 91.7 90.2 
 ------------------------------------------------------ declining mortality, increased LFP ------------------------------------------------------ 
Population 100.0 106.5 103.3 94.7 127.8 158.8 192.6 
- growth rate — 6.5 –3.0 –8.4 27.8 24.2 21.3 
- proportion old 16.8 27.6 34.3 36.3 23.0 25.3 27.0 
- proportion child 25.7 21.5 19.3 18.8 22.1 22.0 21.1 
LF/Pop. ratio 48.1 45.8 42.7 41.3 48.1 46.4 46.0 
National income 100.0 101.4 91.7 81.4 128.0 153.2 184.2 
- per capita 100.0 95.2 88.8 86.0 100.1 96.5 95.6 
- wtd. per capita 100.0 93.0 85.6 82.7 98.1 94.5 93.2 
Note: See relevant parts of note to Table 1. AGEIM is (25, 50, 25) when there is immigration. Declines in mortality are at the average group-specific percentage 
rates of decrease per generation over the previous three-generation time span. Increased LFP means Seniors’ labour force participation rates are increased by half 
(from 20% to 30% for men, 10% to 15% for women). 
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3.8 Effects of Differential Education Assumptions 
This last set of simulations, reported in Table 8, explores the effects of assuming different 
education levels for immigrants in conjunction with alternative age distributions, and the 
consequent effects on productivity and income. There are three assumptions as follows:  
(i) Immigrants have the same education and hence the same productivity level as the 
domestic labour force (the assumption in earlier simulations); an additional immigrant 
member of the labour force thus increases output in the same proportion as an additional 
domestic member.  
(ii) Immigrants have a higher level of education with the result that their productivity is 
20% greater than domestic productivity.  
(iii) Immigrants have a lower level of education with the result that their productivity is 
20% lower than domestic productivity. The quota 𝑞 is set at 20% in all cases and the five 
immigrant age distributions defined previously are coupled separately with each of these 
three assumptions. The alternative productivity levels are applied in each period to the new 
immigrants of that period and the surviving immigrants of previous periods.  
The impact on national income of a higher level of education-related productivity is 
seen immediately, in period 1, and again in the subsequent two periods. The impact trans-
lates also into higher per capita income levels. (The increase in immigrant productivity is 
equivalent to an increase in the size of the immigrant labour force with no corresponding 
increase in the consuming population.) The magnitude of the effects differs with the as-
sumption about the immigrant age distribution — greater for distributions with higher 
concentrations in the working ages, lower for others. 
 
Table 8. Simulations when education-related immigrant productivity can be the same, higher, or lower than domestic productivity, with 
alternative immigration age distributions and q = 20% 
  Same productivity Productivity higher by 20% Productivity lower by 20% 
  t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 
             ----------------------------------------------------------AGEIM like initial population -------------------------------------------- 
National income 100.0 117.7 130.3 143.4 121.9 139.1 155.3 113.5 121.4 131.4 
- per capita 100.0 93.9 90.6 90.0 97.2 96.7 97.5 90.5 84.4 82.5 
- wtd per capita 100.0 92.2 88.4 87.9 95.5 94.4 95.2 88.9 82.4 80.5 
             ------------------------------------------------------------------AGEIM (25,50,25) --------------------------------------------------- 
National income 100.0 122.8 144.3 169.4 128.1 156.0 185.4 117.6 132.7 153.4 
- per capita 100.0 98.0 95.5 95.5 102.1 103.2 104.5 93.8 87.8 86.5 
- wtd per capita 100.0 96.2 93.9 93.6 100.3 101.5 102.4 92.1 86.4 84.7 
            --------------------------------------------------------------- AGEIM (25,75,0) ------------------------------------------------------- 
National income 100.0 122.8 152.6 191.2 128.1 166.0 210.3 117.6 139.3 172.2 
- per capita 100.0 98.0 97.2 98.3 102.1 105.7 108.0 93.8 88.8 88.5 
- wtd per capita 100.0 96.2 96.7 97.0 100.3 105.1 106.6 92.1 88.3 87.3 
            -------------------------------------------------------------- AGEIM (0,67,33) --------------------------------------------------------- 
National income 100.0 131.5 153.2 176.7 138.5 166.6 193.2 124.6 139.7 160.1 
- per capita 100.0 104.9 99.4 99.2 110.5 108.1 108.5 99.4 90.7 89.9 
- wtd per capita 100.0 100.6 96.3 94.8 106.0 104.7 103.6 95.3 87.9 85.9 
           ------------------------------------------------------------- AGEIM (0,100,0) ---------------------------------------------------------- 
National income 100.0 131.5 164.7 207.5 138.5 180.4 228.4 124.6 149.0 186.6 
- per capita 100.0 104.9 101.8 103.0 110.5 111.5 113.4 99.4 92.1 92.7 
- wtd per capita 100.0 100.6 99.9 99.4 106.0 109.5 109.5 95.3 90.4 89.4 
Note: See relevant parts of note to Table 1. 
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Going the other way — reducing immigrant productivity by 20% — produces similar 
results, but in the opposite direction, again depending on the assumed age distribution. We 
interpret these results as implying a lower education level among immigrants. An alterna-
tive interpretation though would be that the education level is the same but the lower 
productivity reflects a higher rate of immigrant unemployment, or that there is underem-
ployment — employment of immigrants in jobs beneath their education level. Any of these 
interpretations, or any combination, would have the same effect — a reduction of the 
productivity of the immigrant labour force.  
We consider only overall income per capita in relation to education and productivity, 
not the actual distribution of income between immigrants and the domestic population. 
However, if immigrants were to have a higher marginal product than domestic workers but 
receive the same per capita income there would be implicit discrimination — in effect a 
transfer of wealth created from the immigrant to the non-immigrant population. If immi-
grants were to have a lower marginal product there would be a transfer in the opposite di-
rection. (More generally, the education characteristics of immigrants and their implications 
for the economy, and for the immigrants themselves, is a topic on its own that deserves 
greater attention than we are able to give it here.)  
4. Conclusions 
Our mythical country of Alpha faces a problem common to many industrialized countries: 
a shift in the age distribution of the population towards a lower proportion in the labour 
force and consequent downward pressure on national income per capita. Immigration can 
be used to moderate the shift but to be effective the quota level may have to be high, the 
distribution of adult immigrants highly concentrated in the working ages, and the propor-
tion of child immigrants low. While immigration will bring about an increase in aggregate 
national income it will also add to the number of consumers sharing in the increase. The 
worker/dependent ratio among immigrants is therefore a fundamental consideration in 
policy design. A larger quota will of course produce a larger effect but how large a quota is 
acceptable from a social point of view is another fundamental consideration. A higher 
overall level of productivity could offset the aging-induced decline in per capita income 
but to be realistically interpreted, productivity would have to be defined in relative terms 
— relative to the level in the rest of the world, that is. A higher level of education and 
hence productivity for immigrants alone would increase overall per capita income, a lower 
level would decrease it, and in either case there is the issue of how the difference would be 
shared between immigrants and non-immigrants. An increase in fertility would raise the 
proportion of dependents in the population and lower per capita income, both immediately 
and subsequently. Falling death rates and rising life expectancy would increase the propor-
tion of older dependents; that could be offset by higher labour force participation rates of 
older people but the increases would have to be proportionately large, and even then might 
provide only a modest contribution.  
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Appendix: The Leslie Matrix 
The Leslie matrix Q used in Equation (1) and subsequent equations is the 10×10 matrix 
shown in Table A1. The first five rows are for female age groups, youngest to oldest; the 
next five rows are for males. The entry in the Q(1,2) cell represents the calculation of fe-
male children, incorporating an adjustment for newborn mortality: F is the fertility rate 
(applied to Young Adult females), rf is the proportion of females at birth, and sf0 is the sur-
vival rate for female births; the entry in the Q(6,2) cell, sm0rmF, represents the correspond-
ing calculation for male children. The group-to-group survival rates for females are pro-
vided in cells Q(2,1), Q(3,2), Q(4,3), Q(5,4); the corresponding rates for males are pro-
vided in cells Q(7,6), Q(8,7), Q(9,8), Q(10,9). 
The Q matrix can be applied sequentially to project an initial population vector n0 k 
generations ahead, ignoring immigration and assuming all rates constant: 1 0 2,n Qn n= =  
1 1, , k kQn n Qn −=  or, more compactly, nk = Q
kn0. (For discussion of Leslie matrices, 
their characteristics and application, see Keyfitz and Caswell, 2005, Chapter 7.) 
The survival rates in Q are calibrated using 2001 Canadian life tables. (The tables are 
based on deaths in the years 2000, 2001, 2002 but are commonly referred to as 2001 tables 
(Statistics Canada, 2006). F is initially set at 1.6 children per woman, the total fertility rate 
in Canada in 2011 (Statistics Canada, 2013a). The ratio of males to females at birth is set 
at 1.05, yielding 0.488 and 0.512 as the female and male proportions, approximately the 
longstanding proportions in Canada. (The ratio 1.05 is within a normal range: “In the ab-
sence of manipulation, the sex ratio at birth is remarkably consistent across human popula-
tions, with 105 – 107 male births for every 100 female births,” Hesketh and Xing, 2006, p 
13271.) 
 
Table A1. The Q matrix for a stable Alpha population with calibrated survival rates 
 Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 Col. 6 Col. 7 Col. 8 Col. 9 Col. 10 
Row 1 0 sf 0rfF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Row 2 0.9942 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Row 3 0 0.9769 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Row 4 0 0 0.8635 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Row 5 0 0 0 0.3798 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Row 6 0 sm0rmF 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Row 7 0 0 0 0 0 0.9875 0 0 0 0 
Row 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9617 0 0 0 
Row 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.785 0 0 
Row10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2575 0 
Note: sf 0 = 0.9940, sm0 = 0.9924. 
 
